Thrown Machines: in Defence of a Heideggerian Cognitive Science
In this talk I shall argue first (and briefly) that the very idea of a Heideggerian cognitive science makes philosophical sense and second (and in much more detail) for a particular vision of what such a cognitive science ought to look like.
To achieve the first of these goals, I shall provide a sketch of how to interpret Heidegger's existential phenomenology such that it is consistent with - indeed, is in a relation of mutual illumination with - the scientific study of mind.
To achieve the second goal, I shall highlight the key elements of Heideggerian cognitive science as I understand it, and then defend my view against some criticisms that have been directed against it by Hubert Dreyfus and Erik Rietveld.
Michael Wheeler is professor of philosophy at the University of Stirling. His primary research interests are in philosophy of science (especially cognitive science, psychology, biology, artificial intelligence and artificial life) and philosophy of mind. He also works on Descartes and Heidegger.
He has authored Reconstructing the Cognitive World: the Next Step (MIT Press, 2005) drawing on sources as seemingly disparate as Heidegger and robotics, in order to articulate and defend a non-standard philosophical framework for cognitive science.
The lecture is open to all, including students. Welcome!